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Abstract 
Lene Sjørup considers the somewhat problematic construct of women's religious 
experiences, more specifically, the mystical experience within women's lives. Mindful of 
womanist, mujerista, and Asian feminist theologies challenges to white feminists that 
feminist theology is often white and ethnocentric, she uses a qualitative sociological 
approach. Sjørup begins with the hypothesis that the interviewees' religious experiences 
would tend toward mystical experiences that she understands to be ineffable, noetic, 
transient, and passive. This is not intended to limit the possibility for other forms of mystical 
experience, however. Sjørup draws on the work of Charlene Spretnak, Carol Christ, and 
Hallie Iglehart lo help provide methodological and theoretical foundations for her study. She 
also explores the differences in the religious experiences of men and women and uses object 
relations theory as a way to understand how research on mysticism has been influenced by 
gender-specific attitudes. Finally, Sjørup questions the efficacy of continuing to follow 
traditional theological paradigms to understand the mystical and how it functions in the lives 
of women and men.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MYSTICISM AND GENDER 
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From 1982 to 1985, I conducted qualitative interviews with ten north American and Danish 
women about their religious experiences. Among the interviewees were Hallie Iglehart, Carol 
P Christ, Charlene Spretnak, and Michelle de Beixedon, as well as six Danish women.
1 
The 
interviews were analysed and the results compared with accounts from the Alister Hardy 
Research Centre in Oxford, where more than five thousand accounts from women and men 
about their religious experiences are gathered.
2 
When I began this investigation, critical 
discussions about the concept ‘women’s religious experiences’ had not yet arisen. I was 
inspired by Mary Daly’s call to ‘hear our own words, always giving prior attention to our own 
experience, never letting prefabricated theory have authority over us.’ Furthermore, I felt, 
like Carol Christ, that ‘[s]tories give shape to experience, experience gives rise to stories.’ I 
also agreed with Rosemary Radford Ruether’s claim that ‘[t]he use of women’s experience in 
feminist theology … as based on male experience.’ I also affirm the following quotations 
from Sallie McFague. ‘[M]odels of God are not definitions of God but likely accounts of 
experiences of relating to God.  [A]ll our texts, including Scripture and the classics of the 
theological tradition, are ‘sedimentations’ of interpreted experience … We will have to do 
the same risky, adventuresome thing that it [Scripture] does: interpret the salvific love of 
God.’
3 
 
My conclusion was, however, that to examine women’s experiences, and women’s religious 
experiences in particular, one would have to take a sociological approach. This, to my mind, 
is the consequence of the purported liberationist claims of white feminist theology, as well 
as womanist, mujerista, and Asian feminist theology’s challenge to white feminists: that 
feminist theology is not only white but also ethnocentric.
4 
In my view, qualitative 
investigations with well-defined groups of women can illuminate differences between 
women and can challenge male universalist pretensions of defining theology as a field.
5 
By 
taking a qualitative approach to women’s religious experiences, we may have a chance in the 
long run of demonstrating how religious discourses not only differ but also change and 
interact. Such an approach can only complexify and enrich feminist theology. In the 
following discussion, I shall briefly present the results of my investigation of the religious 
experiences of a group of women.
6 
I shall describe this group as ‘women’ with the explicit 
understanding that although this group of interviewees was white, North American and 
European, middle and upper class, other and different groups of women might - and should - 
make contesting claims on ‘women’ in another context. 
 
The main hypothesis of the investigation was that the interviewees’ religious experiences 
would tend toward mystical experiences. This hypothesis was based upon my personal 
experiences and interactions with very many women during numerous speaking 
engagements in more than twenty years. It was also connected to my belief that the harsh 
critique of mysticism from objectivist scholars was due to an implicit gendering of mysticism. 
I set out to investigate this gendering to indicate how ‘objectivist’ scholarship is deeply 
biased as well as flawed. Not only is objective scholarship not objective, but the binary of 
subject and object presents problems for understanding religious experiences, particularly 
mysticism. Mystical experiences suggest the need for different epistemologies. The one I 
explore here is that of ‘trans-subjectivity’. 
 
Mystical experiences may be defined as experiences of union with the holy, experiences that 
are ineffable, noetic, transient, and passive.
7 
This definition was not applied as a strict 
criterion that all accounts of religious experiences had to meet for an experience to be 
accepted as mystical; rather, it served as a guideline for characterising experiences. The 
reason is that in judging what is a mystical experience and what is not, the interaction 
between the researcher and the material that is researched becomes crucial. The researcher 
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- as in all research - will be judging on the basis of the person she is, including the 
experiences she has. When the object is mystical experiences, the basis for her judgements 
will be personal experiences, including her own faith and its pre-rational, intuitive elements. 
I doubt that researchers who have not had mystical experiences are able to see them in 
others, unless a very close relationship with the informers exists. This is because of the many 
pre-rational elements, including ineffability, in mysticism. It is very difficult to explain this 
category to nonsympathetic ‘observers.’
8
 It may therefore be even more difficult to claim 
‘objective’ scholarship in relation to mysticism than in relation to other topics. 
 
I decided to use a qualitative interview method to obtain knowledge about women’s 
religious experiences, but a quantitative element was added through the studies at the 
Alister Hardy Research Centre, 
9
 which gave some indications about the generalisability of 
the findings. The ten interviewees chosen were highly articulate, well-informed, and, in a 
cultural sense, high-status women. Since my hypothesis was that women’s religious 
experiences tend toward mysticism, which among other characteristics is described as 
ineffable, some women who work at registering what is barely perceivable had to be 
selected. Therefore, a number of artists were chosen. 
 
The elitist bias of my study was to some extent corrected through the investigation of my 
research group at the Alister Hardy Research Centre.
10
 The Alister Hardy informants, 
however, had been resourceful enough, and articulate enough to write to the Centre, which 
probably in turn screened the informants. Therefore, the entire investigation does have a 
certain elitist bias, which may be defended by the type of investigation conducted: an 
exploration of the qualitative content of religious experiences, which demands articulate 
informants. Moreover, since the purpose of qualitative investigations is to explore 
hypotheses, not to confirm them, representativeness is not necessarily a claim. The data 
presented here should be compared to similar studies of other groups of women to broaden 
the perspective.
11
 
 
The methods for obtaining information from the two groups differed. The interviewed 
persons were asked the following three filter questions and encouraged to elaborate freely 
on them: 
-  Have you had a religious experience? 
-  Do you think men have similar experiences? 
-  What is your relation to institutional religion? 
My role as an interviewer was to mirror feelings, show empathy, and ask deepening 
questions. The Alister Hardy informers, by contrast, having been informed with examples of 
religious experience, had been asked to report their own religious experiences to the centre. 
In my research among the responses, I used the centre’s classification system as an 
introduction to the archive but mainly focused on the actual accounts. I was kindly allowed 
to copy more than 150 accounts, and these became the basis for my work. 
 
Because the method for obtaining information from the two groups differed, the groups are 
not formally comparable. However, the qualitative content of the experiences shows so 
many similarities that a comparison is obvious. As the number of investigations of women’s 
religious experiences increases, the methods for obtaining information also will differ. For 
each investigation, the limited scope must be clearly indicated. This investigation was limited 
to white middle- and upper-class women, as well as being limited by the methods used. 
Because we are interested in the qualitative and not the quantitative, the methodological 
plurality may be defended. Nevertheless, many more investigations of this kind are needed. 
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The Investigation Data 
The hypothesis that women’s religious experiences tend toward mysticism was supported in 
the interview material. An analysis of this material showed that unitive experiences with 
something larger and holier than the self were prevalent in all the interviews. Unitive 
experiences for some interviewees began very early, when the women were very small 
children, but they occurred in different settings. The following experience is exemplary. 
One night when I was about, oh, probably about ten years old, maybe a little younger. It was 
raining outside. And water has always been very powerful for me. I could just smell it in the air, 
and I would sense it all around me. I was writing at my desk, and I decided that what I wanted 
more than anything else was to take off all my clothes and be completely naked, and go out 
into this warm rain and lie down with my face and my body against the ground in the hills. And 
I did that, and good thing I did not let my mother know what I was doing - she probably would 
have had me locked up! I was not afraid. I was not afraid of the darkness, and I was not afraid 
of the cold, or the night, or the nakedness - it was absolute fullness and bliss for me. So I do 
not remember how long it lasted, but I felt very, very full, and very wise, and very sure that I 
was loved, and I somehow had the sense that I had a mission, and that mission was to carry it 
on - to somehow translate to others that same kind of feeling of fullness, the same kind of 
assurance I had, that life was a gift and that we are all one. (de Beixedon). 
For Charlene Spretnak, giving birth was an experience of connectedness. ‘I talked louder 
than I needed to, and I saw everything from different perspectives in the room. It was as if I 
was not only in my body, but I was the whole room.’ This experience imparts to Spretnak an 
awareness of connectedness to others. ‘When something is grown out of your flesh, the 
boundaries between me and not-me become a little blurry … Because a mother is connected 
with her child, she then feels connected with all mothers and all children. That is my 
experience.’ 
 
Sometimes this religious experience of unit takes place in an explicitly political context. Carol 
Christ recalls: 
I can remember being in Washington with 500,000 or 1 million people at the antiwar 
demonstrations and feeling that I was with this massive group of people who were all 
individuals but who all shared something of the feeling I came with, which was a deep feeling 
for the people of Vietnam and for their suffering: a desperate longing for them not to be 
bombed, a not wanting babies to be napalmed. I felt that we were all united in something that 
was very heartfelt, very deep. 
Hallie Iglehart relates her sense of connection and relation even in the midst of very 
different cultures. 
One thing I experienced with the Tibetans was what it was like to be in a culture where 
everything is integrated - spirituality, economics, social life - everything is totally integrated. I 
have only been in one other culture like that, which is the Balinese, where there is an 
intangible feeling that things are in harmony, that you are right in the centre of things. 
These very different contexts of women’s mystical experiences, e.g. giving birth and political 
protest, challenge conventional understandings of religion, sacrality and authority. Suzanne 
Brøgger says that ‘If you experience the wholeness and the interrelation between 
everything, then I guess it is religious. But this is so concrete. I mean, it has nothing to do 
with confession and dogmatics.’
12
 
 
In the Alister Hardy material, unitive experiences are also crucial.
13
 One female informant 
writes, 
At the age of 10 I went with my father into Firth Park, Rotherham, Yorks. It was June and very 
early on a lovely summer morning. The rhododendrons were in full bloom, and there were 
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swans and ducks on the pond. The grass and plants sparkled with dew. I felt, like Sir Julian 
Huxley that I was at one with the Universe. A great crowd of people belonging to past ages 
suddenly lived with me; past and present fused; and I loved them all and EVERYTHING WAS ALL 
RIGHT. Truly a kind of cosmic harmony. (2113, F, age 60)
14
 
Other Hardy informers convey this sense of unity and wholeness in the following 
descriptions: ‘A light shone, and I felt myself enveloped in it, part of it’ (2006, F); ‘The Power 
seemed to take hold of me, or I went into it’ (2136, F, age 38); ‘I would be lifted out of 
myself and suddenly be at one with the Universe’ (2456, F, age 39); ‘I knew, I was also held 
in this unity, every bit of me …. I was the same as what was opening up before me (Or I was 
opening up to)’ (2366,F). 
 
These unitive experiences appear to be new and hesitant attempts at formulating the holy. 
There is a tendency in both the interview material and the Alister Hardy material to describe 
the divine in terms of interconnectedness and boundlessness, and in terms of subtle 
exchanges between the realms of the holy and the human, nature and cosmos. The imagery 
in both instances is much more abstract than conventional anthropomorphic descriptions. 
Terms such as ‘energy,’ ‘power,’ and simply ‘it’ are used. The following account provides a 
vivid example of this language. 
It is something that I cannot ultimately control. It is not there fore my willing it, or any of my 
efforts. It is simply something that sort of graciously is realised through some deep part of my 
being, participating in it. I am definitely participating in it. I am not a spectator. It is not 
something that just happens to me. There is some sort of interpenetration where the power 
and myself are one; and yet there is a difference, because I am limited by a lot of other factors 
… I feel almost as if I could break apart, or burst, or be shredded by the sheer energy of it. It is 
as if I am too small to contain it … I am part of it, because I am part of creation, all creation, 
and I feel that this same power is in the leaves, and in the branches of the trees, and in the 
rocks, and in the ground, and in the air, and in the light, and I am part of it. I have often felt 
when I die and my human consciousness connected with my central nervous system and brain 
and all does not exist any more the way it does in this form, that the cells of my body will still 
carry that same kind of energy. Only it will not be a life force that is living as we understand it. 
It will be transformed into another kind of energy, almost as if the universe is a huge, organic 
recycling mechanism where all energy simply takes on forms, dissolves in those forms, re-
enters the cycle, and goes eternally in this kind of matter-and-energy, matter-and-energy 
dichotomy. (de Beixedon) 
 
These descriptions of unity are paradoxical; there simultaneously is unity and difference. The 
connection to all of creation does not necessitate an annihilation of the self. The self is 
empowered in this experience of unity. Even as borders and boundaries are experienced as 
permeable, an awareness of distinction and difference is maintained. In the third section of 
this essay, I examine how the gendering of the study of mysticism has obscured the 
implications this paradoxical unity and difference has for both gender relations and for 
theological epistemology. 
 
Although both my interview material and the Alister Hardy material evidence a recurrent 
narrative of paradoxical unity, the issue of gender highlights a difference between my 
interviewees’ accounts and those of the Alister Hardy informants. Some Alister Hardy 
informers depict the divine as male whereas none of my interviewees did so. These Alister 
Hardy informers see the divine as an almighty male presence who holds everything in his 
hand and will use his power regardless of human wants and needs. God is the omniscient, 
omnipresent power that demands obedience but is also a comfort in times of trouble. Alister 
Hardy informers also talk about Jesus.
15
 And in these accounts, Jesus quite often is seen as a 
contemporary figure: 
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I was in labour with my only child. I had been in pain and alone for many hours with an 
unsympathetic nurse and doctor popping in occasionally. In desperation I call out ‘Christ, won’t 
you hold my hand.’ Then, just behind my right shoulder (I had to turn my head to see properly) 
I saw Christ, white and smiling. He took my hand in a strong grasp. I fell asleep peacefully. 
(2456, F, age 39). 
Jesus comes today, these informers say, and comforts during pain, in nervous breakdowns, 
or when a job is lost. Jesus is also seen in the poor and suffering.
16
 
 
Gender comes into play in accounts of religious experience not only in the various images of 
the divine but also in the differences between women’s and men’s reporting of religious 
experiences. The Alister Hardy material is a rich resource for analysing these differences. 
Prior to my research project, there was no attempt to examine the possibility of differences 
between women’s and men’s accounts of their religious experiences. 
 
 
Differences in the Religious Experiences of Women and Men 
Among the first 3,000 people who reported religious experiences to the Alister Hardy 
Research Centre, according to Alister Hardy, 2,080 were women, 895 were men and 25 did 
not state their sex.
17
 This suggests a greater interest among women to report their religious 
experiences. According to Alister Hardy, the greater number of women reporting to the 
centre is no indication that women are more religious than men. It shows only that men are 
occupied with too many other things to spend their time writing down their religious 
experiences. That a larger group of women do spend their time describing their religious 
experiences, however, seems to indicate that these experiences are important to them. A 
closer look at the accounts, furthermore, reveals that a number of the male informers were 
ministers, which indicates that a personal interest influenced the reporting of religious 
experiences to the centre. An examination of the actual accounts further shows that a 
number of the informants who are registered as men actually did not state their sex; the 
British researcher assumed that they were men. My interviewees, all women, stated that 
they thought men must have the same kinds of religious experiences they themselves have, 
but that they never met men with whom they were able to exchange such experiences.
18
 
 
Gender differences have not been systematically investigated before at the Alister Hardy 
Research Centre. A closer look at the descriptions mailed to the centre shows not only that 
more women related religious experiences than did men, but also that the men’s 
descriptions tend to be qualitatively different from those of women:
19
 
1. At about 14 years of age recall standing on top of hill overlooking Clyde watching sunset. 
Much struck by experience which was ‘significant’ and not simply aesthetic. 
2. Similar experiences - all at night - in Africa. 
3. Most important category, and all connected with historic places, not necessarily famous. 
Feelings of significance, and not in the romantic sense. Important thing is that on each 
occasion one is aware of an ‘atmosphere’ which is as different from the others as, let’s say, 
those in categories 1 and 2 and are of frequent recurrence. The whole point is that one 
feels that life is significant, that one is part of something great, universal and enduring. 
(2514, M, age 44; informer’s numbering) 
Although both women and men reported experiences of unity with the holy, the differences 
between women’s and men’s religious experiences tend to surface first, in the narrative 
structure; second, in the imagery of the divine; and third, in the settings they reported for 
their experiences. Whereas the women narrated their experiences in a plain, everyday 
language, the men were more likely than the women to rationalise systematise, number and 
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interpret their experiences, sometimes with great verbosity and sometimes summarily and 
abruptly. They might stress what the experience is not, and they often produced a 
conclusion: 
I do not ever remember having admired mountain, sea or forest, and having entered fully into 
the enjoyment of it, without feeling that there was a life energy or power behind it that was 
part of the living universe. I do not remember having admired a sunset, the clouds and colours 
as such. There always seemed to be a breathing, pulsating force which was awe-inspiring, yet 
closely akin to the life within me, but yet infinitely greater than I. It was this that I admired, 
almost worshipped … It was not the life energy as such that made me want to worship. It was 
its kinship, and mine, with the great divine Being who was creator of all that led me to adore, 
not the natural object, or the life energy, but the creative Intelligence behind it all. (217, M, 
age 80). 
At times the preconditions for having these experiences were defined: 
1. I must be alone. 2. I must be in the presence of some beautiful natural scenery or of a clear 
night sky. 3. I must not be suffering from any mental or bodily discomfort. 4. A certain, but not 
excessive, amount of heat (summer or noonday) is necessary. 5. A monotonous, but pleasant, 
sound is also important; such as the singing of cicadas, the wind among the pines or fir trees, 
flowing water or the murmur of the sea. 6. Natural scenes also have considerable influence, 
especially that of thyme, sage and myrtle. Also narcissus flowers and orange and lemon 
blossom. (904, M, age 75). 
This informer added that the last time he had had one of these experiences was in Italy in 
1937, and that conditions since then were not conducive to them.  (It is possible that the 
constant rational pondering of what might lead to these peaceful religious experiences gets 
in the way of actually re-experiencing them.) This tendency toward an objectivist approach 
to the experience is often followed by imagery of the divine as a supreme intelligence: 
There is an Intelligent Consciousness, not limited to a man’s present concept of space and 
time, interested in man’s progress and development, in a moral and ethical, religious 
existence. A graph of my life would show a definite progression and development beyond my 
own planning … Man is a free will agent and can refuse the help, sometimes at his peril and to 
his degeneration. To this Infinite Intelligence, everything is recorded, past, present and future 
in the present NOW. (217, M, age 80). 
Despite this tendency among the male informers to rationalise and objectify their religious 
experiences, they did have experiences of unity similar to the ones that my interviewees and 
the women informers to the Alister Hardy Research Centre reported. 
 
The men’s religious experiences also tended to take place in settings different from the 
settings of women’s religious experiences. This may be demonstrated through looking at 
some gender-specific trigger differences.
20
 War was mentioned as a trigger of religious 
experiences, including experiences of unity, by male informants.
21
 For some, this feeling is 
related to the fear of war, which suddenly is replaced with intense religious feelings. For 
others, the battle itself is ecstasy. Informer number 35 tells how, during World War II, he 
read William James’s The Varieties of Religious Experience in between two battles, wishing 
for a religious experience. He went for a walk and experienced how the river and the trees 
became ‘numinous’ and increased in intensity: 
Then it happened. The experience lasted, I should say, about thirty seconds and seemed to 
come out of the sky … a glimpse of luminous bodies - meteors or stars - circulating in 
predestined courses emitting both light and music … I dropped onto one knee and thought: 
How wonderful to die at this moment. I put a hand over my forehead as if to contain the 
tumult and fend off something. Wonder, awe and gratitude mounted to a climax and remained 
poised for a few seconds like a German star shell. Then began the foreknown descent. (35, M, 
74 years). 
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It seems that the fear of combat leads to a wish for and an ability to open up to a religious 
experience. Informer 35 never again had a similar experience. 
 
For another informer, the religious experience was part of the battle: 
The clearest and greatest example of this awareness of what I believe was the Presence of God 
came to me during the night of August 7
th
, 1915 - the landing of thousands of troops at X-bay. 
Under fire for the first time was a very trying time, and at first I was as afraid as most men 
were. As man after man went down however a Presence came to me which took away all my 
fears and replaced them with a feeling of ecstasy. Everything was overwhelmed with this 
feeling and I was for the time a brave man, without a fear or anxiety in the world. During that 
night I was seriously wounded and disabled in consequence of further military service. The 
memory of this night however and the few other occasions when I have been favoured with 
this nearness of God, have been the outstanding experiences of my long life. (15, M, age 81). 
Men’s religiosity is not generally triggered by the ecstasy of battle. The tendency in the 
material is that the most astonishing accounts of war are related by rather old men. 
However, since the religiosity connected with war might be only one end on a larger scale, 
some of the categories in the centre’s classification system that could be seen as similar to 
war were investigated from the point of view of gender. 
 
Because the centre’s category ‘The prospect of death’ might contain experiences similar to 
the experiences of war, for example, it was investigated further. This category includes the 
responses of a rather high number of men, considering that there are almost twice as many 
female as male informers overall. Nineteen men and twenty-four women related religious 
experiences in connection with the prospect of death. The difference between the women’s 
and the men’s accounts is striking. On the one hand, all the women except one tell serene 
stories about how they themselves or loved ones were close to dying but were helped by 
larger powers. One prayed that her dog who had had a heart attack would survive the crisis! 
The men, on the other hand, tell about terrible disasters: dramatic sicknesses and 
astonishing near-death experiences, some during war, including action-filled and threatening 
dramas on land, in the sea, in the air and through fire. 
 
Women too, seem to have a gender-specific sombre side to their religiosity. 
Depression/desperation is the most common trigger in the three thousand accounts at the 
Alister Hardy Research Centre.
22
 Although male informers also relate religious experiences 
triggered by depression/desperation, the majority of the informers in this category are 
women. Many of these women do not tell why they are depressed or desperate: ‘In a 
moment of despair I knelt beside my bed and cried out, “Oh, God, give me something to live 
for!” As clearly as if the voice was in the room I heard the words “Live for me.” Shortly after 
that, an opportunity arose for taking on what has become a form of social service and my 
life’s work’ (2006, F). The desperation has to do with the whole life situation of the woman, 
of having nothing to live for and the consequent lack of zest for life. Many of the female 
informers of this groups suffered as a result of the death of husbands, parents, or children, 
or as a result of divorce and sickness. But for many, the problem was the emptiness of life in 
general, and the depressions often are non-specific. Depression can have a religious aspect, 
however, as my interviewee Elsa Gress noticed: 
For me it has always been, after terrible depressions, so awful that one cannot see colours, and 
you cannot read, you cannot hear, you cannot see, you cannot do anything. And then you get 
through. Suddenly everything is there again. You could say that this is just because you were so 
low, that seeing a window suddenly can become a mystical experience. 
The few male informers who told about depression or desperation as the basis for religious 
experiences knew why they were unhappy. One, for example, was depressed in connection 
with war, one with losing his job, one with being mentally ill, and two because of loneliness 
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and coldness. There seemed to be no depressions or despair that they were unable to 
explain. The men also seemed to have much more robust ways of solving their problems. 
The following male informer, who was praying in despair of losing his job, is an example: 
I was at home, and had been praying selfishly about my personal affairs the previous night. Just 
before I awoke I heard a voice say ‘Stop bleating.’ I knew it was Jesus. I told my wife. Later that 
afternoon we went walking. About a mile away, amongst many houses, was a very small field. 
It was filled with sheep, dashing about and bleating. Never before had we heard such 
concentrated bleating. They had just been put there and residents were complaining about the 
noise. We had never known the field to be used so before. When praying to Jesus I have been 
very conscious of his personal response. (2070, M, age 50). 
There is a gender difference in the content of depression and desperation, as well as in how 
the difficult situation is solved. The depressions are deeper for the women and have to do 
with their very identity - or lack of it. The answer, therefore, has to do with the total life 
situation of the women. The men know why they are desperate; some pray or receive an 
order, and the experience is over with - or at least this is how they describe it. 
 
Thus, my interviewees’ observation that they were unable to share their religious 
experiences with men seems not to be due to the men not having religious experiences. My 
material seems to indicate that the problems are, first, that fewer men than women have 
such experiences; second, that women and men narrate their religious experiences 
differently; and third, that women’s and men’s religious experiences tend to be triggered in 
different settings. Gender differences such as these may be relatively common. 
 
 
Phenomenology, Epistemology and Object Relations 
A brief look at some of this century’s research on mysticism within the psychology and 
sociology of religion will show how research on mysticism has been influenced by gender-
specific attitudes. Based on this survey, I will discuss phenomenological and epistemological 
aspects of mysticism and analyse them in the light of object relations theory. 
 
At the end of the last and the beginning of this century, mysticism was treated mainly under 
the heading ‘hysteria’ by the emerging psychology of religion.
23
 Hysteria was characterised 
by anesthesia, hyperesthesia, paralysis and contracture, and it could be located in the globus 
hystericus (the thyroid gland). According to James Henry Leuba, it broke out ‘in connection 
with the activity of the reproductive functions; it is, for instance, relatively frequent at 
puberty, in pregnancy, in diseases of the uterus, and the climacteric change.’
24
 Needless to 
say, these so-called sicknesses were considered typical for women. This discussion was a late 
extension of previous medical discussion in which women’s nervous diseases, in particular 
hysteria, were connected with the uterus, which was said to wander about in the body and 
cause neurotic behaviour, especially if the woman was not sexually active (with a man). 
What was new was the connection with mysticism. 
 
According to George Albert Coe, mysticism had a lot in common with hallucinations, 
automatism, self-hypnosis, nervous instability, fatigue, hunger and sexual longing. Not 
surprisingly, Coe, like a number of other scientists who researched mysticism, denounced 
any personal knowledge about the subject: ‘My life has been as free from mysticism as it has 
been free from dogmatism … Life seems to me an ethical enterprise.’
25
 Mysticism and ethics, 
according to Coe, were antithetical. Evelyn Underhill conversely said that the existence of 
pathological explanations ‘no more discredits the sanity of mysticism or the validity of its 
results than the unstable nervous condition usually noticed in artists - who share to some 
extent the mystic’s apprehension of the Real - discredits art.’
26
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Whereas some researchers associated mysticism with women, self-annihilation, unity, and 
absorption, sociologists of religion at the beginning of this century tended to associate 
mysticism with individualism, separateness and being cut off and asocial. This development 
was due to misconceptions about what mysticism is, mixed with methodological problems. 
Methodologically, the description of groups in their purest manifestations tended to lead to 
ahistorical and analytic categories to which actual social institutions and groups were 
applied at a later step. Thus, in Ernst Troeltsch’s ideal typology of church, sect, and 
mysticism, the church is seen as an institution preoccupied with giving salvation to all, the 
sect as groups engaged primarily in ethical questions, and mystics as individualists, 
disintegrating cult, dogma, and tradition.
27
 However, these categories are ahistorical: the 
church always has been engaged in ethics, and mystics always have existed inside as well as 
outside the church. Mystics generally are not and never have been asocial. And both the 
church and mystics always have been deeply engaged in ethical questions. The typology is 
too narrow and, indeed, is intended to be narrow in order to obtain analytical results.
28
 
Mysticism thus becomes an ideal typical category denoting asocial individualism, and 
although this is a purely analytical result, it continues to shape much research on religion. 
 
Max Weber distinguished between asceticism and myticism, seeing mysticism as nonacting 
and nonthinking, an emptying of everything that might remind one of the world and a 
minimising of actions, all with the purpose of reaching an inner state of unio mystica. Weber 
considered this an emotional state that seemed to communicate ‘knowledge’.
29
 Weber’s 
social reductionism, where attitudes of waiting for the holy are confused with lack of social 
abilities, has been quite common in the social sciences, but why was mysticism chosen as 
the target? 
 
Lacking personal knowledge about mysticism, some sociologists of religion tended to define 
mysticism in terms of their reductionism. Thus, Joachin Wach claimed that the Greek word 
myein meant ‘to close one’s self up against the outer world and with it against society, as 
against all distracting and disturbing influences.’
30
 The late Neoplatonists used the word in 
the way Wach suggested. However, myein simply means ‘to close’. In Koine Greek, however, 
it means ‘to initiate’. Originally it probably was used to remind initiates to keep quiet about 
‘the mysteries’. It might also be used about somebody whose eyes still were shut but who 
was about to be initiated.
31
 These sociologists were objectivists,
32
 and their approach to 
mysticsim led to reductionism. Living faith was ridiculed. 
 
 
The research of Ralph W Hood Jr. is an example of more recent objectivist research on 
mysticism. Hood conducted experiments concerning what he termed religious experiences, 
experiences of transcendence, intense religious experiences, reported mystical experiences, 
mystical states of consciousness, and mystical experiences.
33
 Hood’s experiments were 
conducted with students, using scales constructed on the basis of former research, mostly 
the definitions of William James and W T Stace.
34
 In 1977, Hood worked with ‘eliciting 
Mystical States of Consciousness with Semi-structured Nature Experiences,’ wanting to 
measure the relation of stress and mysticism. Since he thought that ‘mystical experiences in 
nature are generally recognised as quite common,’ Hood chose twenty-three men from ‘a 
highly selective, prestigious, private, all male school in the South [of the United States].’
35
 
This group of students planned an outdoor trip, including canoeing, rafting, backpacking, 
obstacle courses, rock climbing and rappelling, jogging, swimming, and ‘solo experiences.’ 
Hood measured the stress anticipated and felt by the students on a ‘Subjective Stress Scale’ 
devised by Berkun and others, observing the ‘psychological and physiological responses in 
observers of an atomic test shot.’ Immediately after the students’ experiences in nature, he 
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tested them on his ‘M-scale,’ which he constructed on the basis of Stace’s characteristics of 
mysticism. Although Hood admitted that people might ‘rationalise this experience as 
“mystical” … if they can only express their feelings on a scale to measure mystical reactions,’ 
he nevertheless repeated his experiment in 1978, since ‘attempts to manipulate mystical 
experience within solitary nature contexts in terms of quasi-experimental designs have not 
been common.’
36
 
 
Why did Hood feel that a scale designed to measure responses to atomic test shots would 
make an adequate measure for responses to mysticism? Are all feelings, whether they be 
fear, stress, a deep peace, or universal love, identical? And why was he so strongly 
interested in reiterating and manipulating mystical experiences experimentally? In Hood’s 
praise of the work of W T Stace we may find an answer: 
Stace in cold, dispassionate logic carefully demarcated the phenomenological characteristics of 
mystical experience and did so with such effectiveness that operational categories can easily be 
developed. This, of course, means that mysticism as a human experience can be studied much 
in the same way an any other human experience … [R]aters can be easily trained to reliably 
classify intense human experiences according to their degree of mystical quality.
37 
Hood’s attitudes as a researcher are illuminating: research into religious experiences can and 
should be conducted coldly and objectively, like a military action, and mystical experiences 
should be studied in the same way as any other area of life. However, was Hood not 
passionately engaged in his research? And why should mystical experiences, which are 
experienced as extremely unusual, be studied like any other area of life? 
 
A number of sociologists and psychologists of religion have had strongly objectivist and 
sometimes quite condescending attitudes toward mysticism. Nevertheless, many of these 
researchers have been deeply fascinated by and have spent a lifetime researching mysticism, 
possibly because the phenomenology and epistemology of mysticism particularly challenged 
them. Mystical experiences often are characterised as unitive experiences that are ineffable, 
noetic, transient, and passive. Such experiences, of course, are accepted only with difficulty 
by those who obtain their wisdom through hard, intellectual, verbal, day-to-day work. The 
reactions of some philosophers to this kind of epistemology are illustrative. Steven Katz, for 
example, reacts with exasperation to the ineffability of mysticism: ‘If the mystic does not 
mean what he says and his words have no literal meaning whatsoever, then not only is it 
impossible to establish my pluralistic view, but it is also logically impossible to establish any 
view whatsoever.
38
 Katz also rejects the ineffability and the paradoxicalness of mystical 
experiences because they ‘do not provide data for comparability, rather they eliminate the 
logical possibility of the comparability of experience altogether.’ Thus, Katz is preoccupied 
primarily by the lack of logic in mysticism.
39
 
 
Peter Moore makes a similar claim: ‘There is … no evidence that mystics are forced by their 
experiences to break the law of non-contradiction.’
40
 According to Moore, radical ineffability 
is characteristic mainly in non-autobiographical reports on mysticism; that is, ineffability is 
stressed by researchers, whereas those who describe their own mystical experiences have 
no trouble expressing them verbally. More presents very little evidence for this latter fact, 
however. The autobiographical material in the present investigation clearly shows that 
ineffability is an authentic characteristic of the mystical experiences. It seems that Peter 
Moore is unable to accept that the law of non-contradiction could be broken. 
 
Another much-debated problem among philosophers is the question of ‘raw experiences’. 
Although Moore accepts the existence of some raw experiences (i.e., experiences that are 
unaffected by the mystic’s prior beliefs, expectations, or intentions), this for Katz is 
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unthinkable. He stresses, ‘There are NO pure (i.e. unmediated) experiences.’
41
 Peter 
Donovan claims that ‘the words we can use and the interpretations we can make may very 
much govern the kind of experience we are able to have,’ adding that ‘[p]eople who lack all 
familiarity with the language, imagery or world-view of the religious system can hardly be 
said to be capable of having religious experiences, for they lack the habits of a mind and the 
awareness of significance which make religiously-interpreted experience possible.’
42
 
 
This clearly is not the case. Even without previous familiarity with religion, people suddenly 
may have mystical experiences, which may be as original and as raw as, for example, the 
experiences of love. A seventy-two-year-old woman, one of the Alister Hardy informers, tells 
how a harebell ‘revealed itself’ to her when she was five years old in ‘a moment of pure 
magic.’ This experience was remembered because of its unexpected and unexplainable 
quality, which ‘etched itself on my memory.’ Of course, the informer does try to express her 
experience through culturally transmitted images, and it may be difficult to distinguish 
between these two layers. However, she and mystics generally are very aware of how 
traditional language does not suffice for describing such ‘raw’ experiences. What Donovan 
and Katz overlook is, first, that new religious experiences arise, and, second, that mystical 
experiences may be a reminder of how we know something, even though we have 
difficulties expressing it verbally. This was the case for many of the interviewees. 
 
W T Stace’s characteristics of mystical experiences as being trans-subjective and paradoxical 
may help in understanding that particular epistemology of mysticism.
43
 Mystical experiences 
are located, he says, in what he names the trans-subjective sphere. They have a certain 
order and repeatability that make them understandable for those who have had similar 
experiences, but they cannot be commonly verified. As the locus of mystical experiences 
thus lies between the objective and the subjective, Stace coins them trans-subjective 
experiences. 
 
The paradoxical nature of mystical experiences, that neither a dualism nor a monism exists 
between the holy and the mystic, is evident in my material.
44
 The mystical experience should 
be defined as an experience of paradoxical unity with the all or with the holy, because this 
definition remains in the area between the holy and the person, which is exactly where it 
belongs. The unity is paradoxical because it is an experience neither of identity with the holy 
nor of alienation from it. It is paradoxical because it lies in between, and both sides must be 
contained. Thus, the experience is simultaneously transcendent and immanent. 
 
Trans-subjectivity and paradoxicalness both seem to call for a non-objectivist science that 
will be open toward transcendent yet at the same time immanent experiences in nature, in 
the body, in social circumstances, in aesthetic situations, in the flow of everyday life, and in 
negative situations where fear and depression grow uncontrollably. What is needed is a 
scientific revolution in which the current objectivist paradigm is supplemented by a new 
epistemology.
45
 The relevant questions are why objectivist science has been so pervasive 
within the research on mysticism and whether this area lies within the psychology and 
sociology of religion or within the philosophy of religion. The entrenchment of an objectivist 
paradigm is, in part, due to its gendered bias both at an experiential and a scientific level, 
46
 
and it may be explained through object relations theory. This theory, however, should not be 
seen as ahistorical. Rather, it describes some elements in the classic white bourgeois 
upbringing, which is the background of most objectivist scientists. 
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According to object relations theory, the process of separation and individuation is not 
identical for boys and girls.
47
 Girls have to disidentify with the mother to become a self. Boys 
also disidentify with the mother as an individual. But they also have to disidentify with the 
mother as feminine and identify with the father as masculine. To become a man, the boy 
must stress autonomy, difference, and separation from nature, woman, body. He must 
secure the freedom of the spirit and its exaltation over the flesh.
48
 
 
This double disidentification of boys vis-à-vis the mother may help to explain why men 
generally seem to have fewer mystical experiences than women and why male researchers 
have trouble with the epistemology of mysticism. If mysticism has its roots in the earliest 
relation to the mother as this relation is being played out at this moment in history, and if 
the double misidentification from the mother sends boys and men out on a quest wherein 
they must slay the dragon and become completely free and independent kings of their own 
realms, it is no wonder that the mystical experiences of paradoxical unity become more 
difficult to return to for men than for women. These experiences may be perceived as a 
threat to men’s masculine identity, which probably is why many of the male Alister Hardy 
informers tried to objectify, categorise and define them, let alone why fewer men report 
religious experiences. Mysticism, being located in the trans-subjective and paradoxical area 
in which there is a unity and yet a difference between the holy and the human, may arise 
from the same area that men fought so hard in order to establish a gender identity. The 
biological unity that at first is a necessity for mere survival later becomes a religious ability to 
experience unity. Science may be considered a typically masculine, bourgeois, objectifying 
activity that particularly appeals to men because of its clear demarcated boundaries of 
subject and object.
49
 According to Evelyn Fox Keller, ‘a science that advertises itself by the 
promise of a cool and objective remove from the object of study selects for those individuals 
for whom such a promise provides emotional comfort.’
50
 Objectivism thus may be seen as a 
comfort for those who suffered strongly from double misidentification. 
 
A brief look at R C Zaehner’s description of nature mysticism will reveal what the scientist’s 
fear is. The sea, the air, trees, water - the commonest symbols of mysticism - are, according 
to Zaehner, ‘nothing more than symbols of the eternal feminine … [This mysticism] is simply 
a sign of infantilism in the adult, the desire to be unconscious once again in the security of 
the womb.’
51
 When the unconscious invades consciousness, Zaehner says, 
it will plunge right down to the level of the Great Mother, in which case it will see itself as 
being at one with Nature … or it will be overcome by the shadow, the Devil … [A]lternatively it 
may plunge right down to the bottom where, religion tells us, we should find the God who 
makes his dwelling in our inmost depths, just like the Incarnate God chose to reside in the 
womb of a Jewess, ‘a narrow and filthy place’ as a Zoroastrian polemicist observes.
52
 
There seems to be no reason for quoting the Zoroastrian racist, except to express Zaehner’s 
own views in a seemingly detached way. The fear of re-engulfment in the feminine is here 
masked not only by objectivism but also by overt deprecation of the female. Not 
surprisingly, Zaehner finds that the soul in ‘true mysticism’ is 
comparable to a virgin who falls violently in love and desires nothing so much as to be 
‘ravished,’ ‘annihilated,’ and ‘assimilated’ into the beloved … The sexual image is, moreover, 
particularly apt since the man both envelops and penetrates the woman, is both within and 
without her, just as God Who dwells at the deepest point in the soul also envelops it and 
covers it with His infinite love. It is for this reason that the Virgin Mary is a perfect image of the 
soul in grace and in love as it is possible to find - Mary, enveloped and penetrated through and 
through by the Holy Ghost and made pregnant of the eternal Wisdom of God.
53
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Note that Zaehner inverts the gender roles in ‘true mysticism.’ Rather than being dissolved 
into the Great Mother, the female soul is annihilated by a Father God. The sexual and 
theological inversion expresses the male fear of connection with the feminine, the Great 
Mother. The ‘filthy’ Goddess who threatens to engulf the male is transformed into the 
perfect soul ‘enveloped and penetrated through and through.’
54
 
 
 
Theology as an Academic Discipline 
There are several indications that the religious experiences found in this study are quite 
characteristic for current spirituality among a number of women and some men.
55
 Women 
working with theology will therefore have to question whether theology as an academic 
discipline can follow the paradigms it has tended to follow so far, or whether a change of 
paradigm and epistemology is necessary. It seems to me that the traditional theological 
paradigms of creation, fall, redemption and Father, Son and Holy Spirit must be set aside for 
a while as the knowledge of our fathers. Although these paradigms may be valuable in a lot 
of contexts, they also are limited by their particular historical underpinnings. New 
theological paradigms arise out of new experiences, which do not just contest the religious 
experiences of the fathers and their theological paradigms but also call for entirely new 
theological thought patterns. 
 
The dissolution of traditional theological paradigms is already happening within much of 
feminist theology. However, theologians who investigate women’s religious experiences and 
who wish to construct new theological paradigms, even though these might be more in 
accord with the actual experiences of women and men, tend to be vehemently criticised, if 
not marginalised and outright rejected at universities and seminars, especially if their 
positions depend upon a nihil obstat from local Catholic bishops, or if their work is evaluated 
by the male colleagues who mainly employ them. 
 
Nevertheless, I am convinced that the ‘trans-subjective’ epistemology of mysticism is crucial 
to theology in general. Theology cannot be ‘objective’ and maintain a binary opposition 
between subject and object, the divine and the human, just as theology cannot in its deeper 
aspects be distinguished from the faith of the scientist. Deeper theological discoveries are 
revelatory. Personal belief and theological results are intertwined, and they develop and 
change according to developments in personality, life stages,
56
 and social situations. A 
theologian who is willing to see the radical implications in this idea (and I am not just 
speaking about the hermeneutical problem, although this of course has similar dimensions) 
will acknowledge that she is engaged in the very slippery zone between the holy and the 
personal that is typical for mysticism. She must work with her own faith.
57
 
 
I have thus come full circle: I see us as both theologians and believers engaged in an area in 
which the holy and the personal meet and mix. If the holy is taken seriously, its reality must 
be taken seriously as well. It will reach us with the love that is characteristic of it, and it will 
not be controlled through any method but may be approximated through a plurality of 
methods and attitudes. Qualitative and quantitative, objectivist and holistic, rational and 
intuitive methods thus are supplementary means for reaching what we are reached by. Elsa 
Gress’s statement in my interview may illustrate this by way of conclusion: ‘You receive it 
[the mystical experience] as a gift. Or rather, it is there all the time, but you are closed off 
from it … Sometimes you suddenly receive a pair of binoculars or this hearing aid, and you 
hear the heartbeat in there in the big uterus. Bom. bom, bom, bom.’ 
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1. Hallie Iglehart is the author of Womanspirit: A Guide to Women’s Wisdom (San Francisco: 
Harper & Row, 1983) and The Heart of the Goddess: Art, Myth, and Meditations of the 
World’s Sacred Feminine (Berkeley: Wingbow Press, 1991). 
 Carol P Christ is the author of Diving Deep and Surfacing: Women Writers on Spiritual Quest 
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1980) and Laughter of Aphrodite: Reflections on a Journey to the 
Goddess (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1987), and is editor, with Judith Plaskow, of the 
important anthologies on feminist theology Womanspirit Rising: A Feminist Reader in 
Religion (New York and San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1979) and Weaving the Visions: New 
Patterns in Feminist Spirituality (New York and San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1989). 
 Charlene Spretnak is the author of Lost Goddesses of Early Greece: A Collection of Pre-
Hellenic Myths (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1982), Green Politics: The Global Promise (with 
Fritjof Capra) (London: Grafton, 1985), The Spiritual Dimensions of Green Politics (Santa Fe: 
Bear, 1986), and States of Grace: The Recovery of Meaning in the Postmodern Age (San 
Francisco: Harper & Row, 1991), and the editor of The Politics of Women’s Spirituality: 
Essays on the Rise of Spiritual Power within the Feminist Movement (Garden City, NY: 
Anchor-Doubleday, 1982). 
 Michelle de Beixedon was a theology student at the Graduate Theological Union at the time 
of the interview and is now a doctoral student there. 
 The six Danish women were four authors, Suzanne Brøgger, Elsa Gress, Ulla Ryum, and 
Charlotte Standgaard; Nynne Koch, the instigator of the Royal Library’s Women’s 
Department and also an author; and the film director Irene Stage. 
 I thank the interviewees for sharing their experiences with me. Excerpts from the interviews 
are indicated parenthetically in the text. The points made in the article are mine, not the 
interviewees. 
2. Alister Hardy was a professor of zoology at Oxford University. After his retirement in 1969, 
he tried to confirm his hypothesis that emotions and spirituality might be explained through 
biology (see his The Spiritual Nature of Man: A Study of Contemporary Religious Experience 
[1979; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985], by gathering a large pool of material on religious 
experiences. In radio, newspaper and TV interviews, he asked people to report their 
religious experiences to the Alister Hardy Research Centre, and as a result, the centre 
received a number of accounts, some very brief, some small novels, some handwritten, 
some typed. After the first one thousand accounts were received, a pamphlet was printed in 
which examples from the first accounts were quoted, and people were again asked to 
report to the centre. On the basis of the first three thousand accounts, Hardy and his 
assistant Vita Toon devised a classification system that, to a high degree, is inspired by his 
background as a zoologist. Thus, sensory or quasi-sensory experiences, such as visual, 
auditory, tactile, and olfactory experiences are distinguished from extrasensory perceptions, 
such as telepathy, precognition, and clairvoyance. Other categories are behavioural 
changes, cognitive and affective elements, the development of the experiences, their 
dynamic patterns, dreams, and triggers, and the consequences of the experiences. 
3. Mary Daly, Beyond God the Father (Boston: Beacon Press, 1973), 189 (Daly’s emphasis); 
Christ, Diving Deep and Surfacing, 5; Rosemary Radford Ruether, Sexism and God-Talk: 
Toward a Feminist Theology (Boston: Beacon Press, 1973), 13 (Radford Ruether’s emphasis); 
Sallie McFague, Models of God (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1987), 39, 42, 44. 
4. See, for example, Jacquelyn Grant, White Women’s Christ and Black Women’s Jesus 
(Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1989), 195; Consuelo Del Prado, ‘Yo siento a Dios de otro modo,’ in 
El rostro feminino de la teologia, ed. Clara Bingemer at al. (Costa Rica: DEI, 1985), 73-83; and 
Chung Hyun Kyung, Struggle to be the Sun Again: Introducing Asian Women’s Theology 
(New York: Orbis, 1990), 111-12. 
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5. See Susan Brooks Thistlethwaite, Sex, Race, and God (New York: Crossroad, 1991). 
6. My book Oneness: A Theology of Women’s Religious Experiences (Kampen, Holland: Kok 
Pharos, in press) contains a more in-depth analysis of this group. 
7. Among the very many definitions of mysticism, the definition of William James has been 
chosen (see The Varieties of Religious Experience [1902; New York: Mentor Books, 1958], 
292ff). Not only is James’ definition commonly accepted, but his pragmatic philosophy, 
which is grounded in empiricism, may give some clues to understanding the 
phenomenology of mysticism. Passivity as an element in mysticism has been criticised by 
some feminists mainly for ideological reasons: ‘strong women’ are not comfortable with 
passivity. However, mystical experiences are received for free, as a grace; they cannot be 
possessed or conquered. In this respect they are ‘passive’. 
8. I do not agree with researchers who claim that science is science and that anything human 
may be examined by any scientist (see, for example, Ninian Smart, ‘Understanding Mystical 
Experience,’ in Mysticism and Philosophical Analysis, ed. Steven T Katz (London: Sheldon 
Press, 1978), 20. It seems to me that the scientist, to be able to establish confidence and to 
get full information about an experience, must be able to contain it. Quite a lot of valuable 
information may be lost if the researcher is unable to show a degree of mirroring and 
empathy. See Frtis Staal, Exploring Mysticism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975). 
9. The accounts at the Alister Hardy Research Centre are qualitative because they are people’s 
own written words, but in the context of this investigation they add a quantitative element 
because of the large number of accounts. 
 Formerly, quantitative and qualitative methods were considered mutually exclusive and 
were defended by their respective schools. However, a researcher who applies quantitative 
methods is not necessarily a positivist, and one who uses qualitative methods is not 
necessarily a phenomenologist. Today, most sociologists, anthropologists, and ethnologists 
apply a combination of methods. Quantitative methods have been developed mainly to 
verify or confirm theories, whereas qualitative methods have been developed mostly to 
discover or develop theories. See Thomas D Cook and Charles S Reichard, Qualitative and 
Quantitative Methods in Evaluation Research (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1979). 
10. Matthew B Miles and A Michael Huberman, in Qualitative Data Analysis: A Sourcebook of 
New Methods (Beverly Hills, Sage Publications, 1984), talk about three typical biases: the 
holistic fallacy, that events are interpreted as more patterned and more congruent than 
they really are; the elite bias, that data from articulate, well-informed, and usually high-
status informants is overweighed while data from intractable, less articulate, and lower 
status informants is toned down; and going native, wherein the researcher loses perspective 
or ‘bracketing’ ability and is co-opted into the perceptions and explanations of local 
informants (230). 
11. For example, my present project, ‘Religion and Democracy: Poor Chilean Women Speak 
Out,’ is an investigation of the theological repertoires of resistance against the military 
theology of Augusto Pinochet, among about three hundred poor and marginalised women 
living mainly in the shantytowns of Santiago and Valparaiso. 
12. These statements do not reflect experiences in the sense of oplevelse/Erlebung (raw 
experience). They are experiences built up over time after very many oplevelser/Erlebungen. 
Getting at this idea is what was intended with the filter question about interviewees’ 
attitude toward institutional religion, as well as with the question about whether the 
interviewees thought men had religious experiences similar to their own. Thus, not only is 
this investigation engaged with raw experiences, but the interviewees also function as 
partners in debate. Steiner Kvale, in ‘The Primacy of the Interview,’ Methods: A Journal for 
Human Science (Spring 1989), calls the interview situation a locus of knowledge: ‘[T]he 
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interview is an interpersonal situation, a dialogue taking place in the medium of language. It 
is conversation between two partners about a common theme of interest to both where the 
knowledge develops in the dialogue’ (33). 
13. Unitive experiences in the Hardy material are much more important than indicated in the 
subcategory title ‘Feeling of unity with surroundings and/or with other people,’ which is 
contained within the larger category ‘Sensory or quasi-sensory experience: visual.’ An 
independent reading of the accounts in the centre shows that this category is too limited to 
contain the unitive experiences of the material, which are neither just sensory nor just 
visual. 
14. In parenthetical citations from the Alister Hardy material throughout the essay, the number 
corresponds with the archive number of the Alister Hardy Research Centre, the gender of 
the informer is indicated by F or M, and the age is stated if the informer supplied it. 
15. Because their categorisation system was based mainly upon biology, Hardy and Toon did 
not establish any category for statements and experiences about Jesus. Considering the 
centrality of Christianity in the British context, this is a weakness of their system. 
16. Experiences such as these are documented in other investigations, such as G Hillerdal and B 
Gustafsson, De si og hørte Jesus: Kristusîbenbaringer i vor tid (Copenhagen: Strube, 1988). 
17. Hardy, 30. 
18. Women’s statements about men’s religious experiences are no source of men’s religious 
experiences. They do, however, tell us something about gender relations seen from the 
point of view of one sex. This is true for the long tradition of male theological statements 
about the nature of women as well. 
19. This is a tendency and cannot be demonstrated in all accounts. Some female informers are 
more systematic, whereas some men’s accounts are more narrative. 
20. Marghanita Laski, in her book Ecstasy: A Study of Some Secular and Religious Experiences 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1962), coined the term trigger for the context in 
which religious experiences arise. The Toon and Hardy categorisation of triggers is 
accessible only at the centre, although it is briefly explained in Hardy’s The Spiritual Nature 
of Man (cited in n. 2). 
21. The first 500 accounts reported to the centre were researched. Among these are 152 male 
informers, of whom 33 mention war. War is not included in the categorisation system of the 
centre. Again it should be stressed that I am pointing at tendencies, not absolutes. 
22. Among the first 1,000 informers, depression and/or desperation was reported by 127 
women and 38 men. Among the 3,000 informers categorised, depression was a trigger for 
religious experiences for 551. 
23. See G Hahn, ‘Les phénomènes hystériques and les révélations de sainte Therèse SJ,’ Revue 
des questions scientifiques 13-14 (Brussels, 1893), in which he concluded that Teresa of Ávila 
was the great Hysterian. The French psychiatrist Pierre Janet, in Major Symptoms of Hysteria 
(New York: Macmillan, 1907), named Teresa ‘La célèbre patronne des hystériques.’ His work 
was extensively used by psychologists of religion. George Albert Coe concluded that ‘a close 
relation may be found to exist, in individual cases, between mystical religion on the one 
hand, and hysteria, or epilepsy, or delusional insanity on the other’ (The Psychology of 
Religion ([Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1917], 278). J B Pratt called the mystics ‘at 
least incipiently hysteric’ (The Religious Consciousness [New York: Macmillan, 1921], 371). 
James Henry Leuba concluded that ‘St Catherine of Genoa, Santa Theresa, Mme Guyon and 
St Marguerite Marie suffered from hysterial attacks’ (The Psychology of Religious Mysticism 
[London: Kegal Paul, 1925], 191), and claimed that ‘a prolific, if not the most prolific, source 
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of psycho-neurosis is an abnormal sexual life. None of our great mystics enjoyed a normal 
sex-life’ (193). The ‘hysteria’ of the mystics, in other words, could have been cured through 
active heterosexuality. 
24. Leuba,192. 
25. Coe, xiii-xiv. 
26. Evelyn Underhill, Mysticism: A Study in the Nature and Development of Man’s Spiritual 
Consciousness (1917; New York: Meridian, 1974), 60. William James shared this attitude. 
See Varieties of Religious Experience (cited in n. 7), 317. 
27. Ernst Troeltsch, Die Soziallehren der christlichen Kirchen und Gruppen (Tübingen: J C B Mohr, 
1912), 967. 
28. The analytical results obtained, of course, often mirror the views of the researcher. The 
tendency within sociology to obtain blatantly wrong results through analytic methods may 
be observed today in, for example, J Milton Yinger, The Scientific Study of Religion (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1970), where Yinger finds that ‘the modal response … [for] 
upwardly-mobile but insecure middle-class Japanese city dwellers may be high-intensity, 
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